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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT-CIVIL
FORFEITURE-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-The Supreme Court of the
United States held that absent exigent circumstances, the Due
Process Clause does require the Government to provide notice
and a hearing before seizing real property that is subject to civil
forfeiture.
United States v. Good, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
On January 31, 1985, Hawaii police officers found a substan-
tial amount of drugs in the home of James Daniel Good
("Good").' Approximately six months later, Good was convicted
of promoting a harmful drug, in violation of Hawaii law.2 Over
four years after Good's arrest, the United States, pursuant to
Section 881(a)(7) of the Controlled Substance Act, filed an in
rem action' seeking forfeiture of Good's real property.' Thereaf-
ter, in an ex parte proceeding,' a United States magistrate is-
1. United States v. Good, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 (1993). In the process of car-
rying out a valid search warrant, police officers found eighty-nine pounds of mar-
ijuana, hashish oil and drug paraphernalia. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
2. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1245(lXb) (1985)).
Good was sentenced to one year in jail, a $1,000 fine and five year's probation.
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
3. 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX7) (1988).
4. An in rem action is a proceeding brought against a person for the purpose
of determining interests or title in real property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th
ed. 1990). It is an action taken directly against real property, as opposed to personal
property. Id.
5. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497. Good's real property was comprised of a house on
four acres of land. Id. Section 881(aX7) of the Controlled Substance Act provides
that real property is subject to forfeiture to the United States, and all property
rights shall cease to exist, if the property is used to commit a federal drug offense
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX7) (1988).
6. An ex parte proceeding is a hearing where only one party is heard.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
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sued a warrant of arrest in rem,7 after finding probable cause
that Good's property had been used to commit a federal drug
offense.' Without prior notice or a hearing, the Government
seized Good's house, which he was renting at the time.'
Good filed a claim to the property and answered the Govern-
ment's complaint with two arguments."0 He argued that his
property was taken without due process of law, and that the
forfeiture action should have been dismissed because it was
untimely under the Tariff Act." The district court disagreed
and entered an order forfeiting the property. 2
Following the district court's order forfeiting the property,
Good appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 3
The court of appeals held that the taking of Good's property
without prior notice and a hearing violated the Due Process
Clause. 4 Furthermore, the court held that Good had a substan-
tial interest in his rental property. 5 The majority reasoned
that a house was different than personal property in that it was
immovable, and therefore precedent involving personal property
was not dispositive.'
The court noted that the state's interests could not have been
7. A warrant of arrest in rem is a written order of the court commanding
law enforcement officials to seize property so that the property can be brought under
the jurisdiction of the court. BLAcK's LAW DI IoNARY 1585 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497. The magistrate found probable cause based on a
drug enforcement agent's sworn affidavit. United States v. Good, 971 F.2d 1376,
1378 (9th Cir. 1992), modified, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). The affidavit was based on
evidence gathered in Good's home on January 31, 1985. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378.
9. Good, 114 S Ct. at 498. At the time of the seizure, Good was renting his
house to tenants at $900 a month. Id. He was not living anywhere on the premises
at the time. Id. The Government allowed Good's tenants to remain in the house but
ordered them to direct the rent payments to the U.S. Marshall instead of Good. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Section 1602 of the Tariff Act provides that customs agents (or any
person authorized to make seizures) must report to customs officers. 19 U.S.C. §
1602 (1988). Customs officers must promptly report any seizure to the United States
attorney. 19 U.S.C. § 1603. The United States attorney immediately must bring a
forfeiture action if he or she believes a violation of law occurred that warrants a
seizure. Id. at § 1604.
12. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378. The district court granted the Government's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Id. The court relied on section 881(b) of the Controlled
Substances Act, which provides, in part that, the Attorney General may seize proper-
ty subject to forfeiture to the United States "pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims by any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction over the property." 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
13. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 498.
14. Good, 971 F.2d. at 1384. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides, in part, "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. Good, 971 F.2d at 1384.
16. Id.
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substantial because the Government waited over four years to
proceed with a seizure hearing." The court, however, was di-
vided on the question of whether the Government's filing of the
in rem action complied with the provisions of the Tariff Act."
The Ninth Circuit failed to determine when the Government
should have started forfeiture proceedings under the Tariff
Act. 9 The court remanded the case to the district court to de-
termine when the Government's duty to start forfeiture proceed-
ings was triggered.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2' to re-
solve two issues.' First, the Court questioned whether, in the
absence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause re-
quired that notice and an opportunity to be heard be provided to
an owner of real property in a civil forfeiture case.' The Court
also considered whether the Government could bring a forfeiture
action without complying with the statutory timing provisions if
the action was filed within the statute of limitations.' With
regard to the first issue, the Court held that absent exigent
circumstances, the Due Process Clause did require the Govern-
ment to furnish notice and a hearing before seizing real property
subject to civil forfeiture.'
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority," first discussed
whether the Fourth Amendment was the sole constitutional
provision controlling the constitutionality of government seizures
of real property for the purpose of forfeitures.2" Contrary to the
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1382.
19. Id.
20. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382.
21. United States v. Good, 113 S. Ct. 1576 (1993).
22. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
23. Id. Exigent circumstances exist when a law enforcement agency is unable
to execute an arrest, search, or seizure for which probable cause exists unless they
act without prior judicial authorization. BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 574 (6th ed. 1990).
24. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
25. Id.
26. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect
to parts I and III. Id. Part I of the opinion discussed the facts, while part III re-
solved the issue of whether the government could bring a forfeiture action without
complying with the statutory timing provisions if the action was filed within the
statute of limitations. Id. Joining Justice Kennedy in parts II and IV were Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. id. Parts II and IV determined whether
the Due Process Clause required that notice and an opportunity to be heard must
be provided to an owner of real property in a civil forfeiture case. Id.
27. id. at 499. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
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Government's position," the Court found that the Fourth
Amendment did not provide all the due process required by the
Fifth Amendment when the government seized property subject
to forfeiture. 9 The majority asserted that both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments had to be taken into consideration when an
alleged violation occurred in the government's seizure of proper-
ty.r0
In analyzing the issue of the applicable amendments in forfei-
ture cases, the Court distinguished civil forfeitures from crimi-
nal arrests.3 ' The opinion maintained that criminals had more
safeguards to ensure their due process was not violated than did
individuals whose property had been seized for forfeiture. 2 The
Court distinguished the two situations by asserting that the
government usurped ownership and control over property in a
forfeiture context as compared to preserving evidence for trial in
a criminal context.' The Court opined that the Government's
usurpation of ownership and control invoked the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
The Court distinguished the case at bar from Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,' in which the Court last addressed
ex parte seizures of property under the Due Process Clause.3"
In Calero-Toledo, personal property was seized.37 The Court
decided that the seizure of the home in Good was distinguish-
able from the seizure of the yacht in Calero-Toledo, because a
yacht, or other personal property, could be easily removed from
the jurisdiction, and thereby frustrate governmental interests.38
In determining whether the seizure of Good's real property
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. The Government argued that civil forfeiture proceedings only implicated
the Fourth Amendment because civil forfeitures served a law enforcement purpose,
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
29. Id. See note 14 for relevant text of the Fifth Amendment.
30. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment was geared to protect
the criminal defendant. Id.
33. Id. at 500.
34. Id.
35. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
36. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)). In Calero-Tokedo, a yacht was seized after authorities
found marijuana aboard the vessel. Calero-Toiedo, 416 U.S. at 665. See notes 146-50
and accompanying text for further discussion of Calero-Toledo.
37. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500.




complied with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Court used the three part balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge.s' Implementing the test, the Court first
considered Good's private interest and how it was affected by
the seizure of his property." It then considered any risk of er-
ror in taking his property through the process of ex parte sei-
zure; and finally, it considered whether exigent circumstances
warranted taking Good's property without notice and a hear-
ing.
41
The Court found that Good had significant interests in his
real property before it was seized.' In opposition to the Court's
finding that Good had a significant interest in the property, the
Government asserted that, in reality, all that was taken from
Good was his interest in collecting $900 of rent every month.'
The Court disagreed with this assertion and opined that a depri-
vation of $900 of rent was nevertheless worthy of due process
protection."
Applying the second prong of the Mathews test, the Court
concluded that the ex parte seizure created an unreasonable risk
of error.' The Court determined that an ex parte proceeding
provided little protection to the owner because a magistrate
judge need only find probable cause to take the real property.'
An error, therefore, would be significant because even if a claim-
ant prevailed at a postseizure hearing, there was no cure for the
temporary loss he suffered when the property was seized.47
In evaluating the strength of the state's interests, the Court
concentrated on the specific interest in seizing real property
before a forfeiture hearing is held, not on the more general in-
terest of seizing property once a crime was committed.' The
39. Id. at 501 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). In Mathews,
the Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment re-
quired a recipient of social security disability payments be given a hearing before
the payments were terminated. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. See notes 151-60 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Mathews.
40. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
41. Id.
42. Id. The seizure took away Good's ability to collect rent, rights of owner-
ship and any enjoyment of his land. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
46. Id. at 502. The Court noted that the government's interests were strongly
favored in an ex parte proceeding because the burden of production was slight in
proving probable cause. Id. Also, the government was not required to raise a valid





Court held that the government's interest did not justify seizing
real property before a forfeiture hearing.49 Governmental inter-
ests could have been met without the immediate seizure of the
property.'
The majority further distinguished the situation in Good from
cases that were decided in the mid-to-late 19th century that
permitted ex parte seizures of real property when the govern-
ment wanted to raise revenues.5' The Court's rationale in the
earlier cases was based on the existence of the government's
"executive urgency" in collecting taxes.52 The Good Court noted
that the government's revenue raising abilities were no longer
dependent on seizures, due to the adoption of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.' Consequently, the Court concluded that not allow-
ing for a hearing before the seizure was not essential for the
protection of the government's revenues."
In deciding the second issue, whether the Government could
bring a forfeiture action when it did not comply with the statuto-
ry timing provisions, a unanimous Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that courts could not dismiss a forfeiture ac-
tion filed within the five year statute of limitations, for noncom-
pliance with the internal timing requirements of the Tariff
Act. 5 The Court noted that Congress had failed to provide con-
sequences for noncompliance with the timing requirements in
the statute.56 The Court asserted that where Congress was si-
lent, the government did not lose its right to bring a forfeiture
action.17 Because there was a statute of limitations in place the
49. Id. at 503.
50. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 503. The Court noted that by filing a notice of lis
pendens, sale of the property could have been prevented when forfeiture proceedings
commenced. Id. The majority further contended that the Government could have
obtained a restraining order to prevent the property from being destroyed. Id.
51. Id. at 504 (quoting Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880) (noting that
the prompt payment of taxes may be vital to the existence of a government)). See
also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338, 352 n.18 (1977) (reasoning that the
government's existence relied on prompt collection of revenue).
52. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 504.
53, Id. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-7872 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
54. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 504.
55. Id. at 507.
56. Id. at 506.
57. Id. In U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo, a suspect posed a danger to the commu-
nity and was required to be detained. U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 713
(1990). The issue was whether the suspect had to be released because of the failure
to provide him with an immediate hearing. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 713. The
Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the suspect was not entitled to be
released. Id. at 722. The Court reasoned that noncompliance with the timing re-
quirement was harmless error. Id. Similarly, in Brock v. Pierce County, the respon-
dent argued that the failure of the Secretary of Labor to investigate within a certain
332 Vol. 33:327
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Court concluded that it was highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended that the action be dismissed for noncompliance with the
internal timing requirements."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, disagreed with the
majority's reasoning regarding the Due Process Clause, and
argued that the majority's use of the Mathews balancing test
conflicted with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inqui-
ry."9 The dissent asserted that the constitutional provisions of
the Fourth Amendment alone gave Good all the process due.'
The Chief Justice opined that the Court's reasoning on the sub-
ject of probable cause was inconsistent, in that the government
could restrain a person's freedom based on probable cause but
could not take a person's property based on probable cause. 1
The dissent also attacked the majority's distinction between a
yacht and real property. 2 The opinion concluded that just as
personal property could be moved, destroyed or concealed, a
home likewise could be damaged or destroyed."
Justice O'Connor also differed with the majority's holding.'
In a separate dissent, she argued that seizure for purposes of
forfeiture was an "extraordinary situation" for which the Due
Process Clause did not require a hearing or notice." Justice
O'Connor, similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that prop-
erty owners received all the process due at the postseizure hear-
ing.' Further agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist, she point-
time period divested the Secretary of his authority to investigate. Brock v. Pierce
County, 476 U.S. 253, 257 (1986). The Court held that when there were less drastic
remedies available to satisfy the statutory timing provisions and when Congress was
silent, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power
to act. Brock, 476 U.S. at 260.
58. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 507.
59. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice was joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor who joined in parts II and III only. Id. The
dissent opined that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry balances an
individual's security in his home against searches and seizures for law enforcement
purposes. Id. at 508.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 510.
63. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 510 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the same reasons for finding that no violation of the Due
Process Clause occurred in Calero-Toledo existed in this case. Id. The considerations
that justified postponement of notice and a hearing in Calero-Toledo were: public
interest in preventing criminal activity on the property; the destructibility of proper-
ty; and the initiation of seizure proceedings by the government rather than by self-
interested private parties. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679.





ed out that the only distinction the majority could make between
precedent and the case at bar was the distinction between real
property and personal property.' She maintained, however,




Justice O'Connor, however, supported the use of the Mathews
test.69 First, she argued that there had not been any interfer-
ence with Good's possessory interests because he did not live on
the property.7 Second, Good previously pled guilty to promot-
ing a harmful drug, which reduced the likelihood of error.7
Third, once a drug offense had been committed on the property,
there was strong public interest in preventing the criminal activ-
ities from continuing.72 Based on these three reasons, Justice
O'Connor opined that the governmental interests in the property
were substantial.73
Justice Thomas agreed with both Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.' He also differed with the Court's interpre-
tation of its precedent." Justice Thomas disagreed with the
finding that the government's financial concerns governed due
process analysis.7" Furthermore, he disagreed with the
majority's reasoning that collection of revenues was more essen-
tial a century ago than it was today."
For a better understanding of governmental seizures and the
amendments that govern seizures of property, it is necessary to
explore the historical background of ex parte seizures and the
history of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as they relate to
seizures. This note first examines early ex parte seizures, and
follows with an examination of cases in which the Supreme
Court applied the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court permitted the govern-
ment to seize real property through ex parte proceedings." In
1856, the Court addressed the issue of deprivation of due pro-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 513 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 514.
73. Id. at 516.




78. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 504 (citing Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586, 593-94




cess of law when the government seized real property in
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 9 In
Murray's Lessee, the collector of customs owed money to the
government.8 The government took the collector's real property
pursuant to a warrant of distress to satisfy the money due."l
When the collector brought suit before the Supreme Court, the
Court found that since the establishment of the English monar-
chy, there had always been some type of summary proceeding to
satisfy debt due to the government.82 The Court further traced
the history of the law, focusing on the Massachusetts Act of
1786, which provided that a sheriff could seize real property by
a warrant of distress to satisfy any sums owed to the govern-
ment." After analyzing the history of governmental seizures,
the Court held that due process was not violated when the gov-
ernment took real property to satisfy a balance due.'
Similarly, in Springer v. United States,' the issue was
whether the government could seize and sell the plaintiffs real
property to satisfy an income tax debt owed to the govern-
ment." In Springer, the plaintiff was notified that unless he
paid the required tax on his income within ten days, he would
be subject to a penalty. 7 The plaintiff refused to pay the tax,
and consequently, his property was levied upon and taken from
him. ' The Court held that the prompt payment of taxes for
public welfare made it necessary to seize property to enforce the
payment of taxes.8 9 The Court explained that the payment of
taxes was essential to the government's existence. ' The majori-
ty concluded that because Congress had the power to seize and
79. 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
80. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 275.
81. Id. at 274.
82. Id. at 277. The Court, in discussing the Magna Carta, reasoned that if the
debtor did not have any other means to satisfy his debt to the government except
his land, the government could take his land to satisfy the debt. Id. at 277.
83. Id. at 279. The Court explained that the Massachusetts Act of 1786 was
one of the many laws passed by the states in the 1780's to ensure that the states
collected delinquent taxes. Id.
84. Id. at 280.
85. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
86. Springer, 102 U.S. at 592.
87. Id. at 586.
88. Id. At the time of the refusal of payment, the plaintiff had no goods or
chattel that could have been sold to pay the tax and penalty, thus the property was
taken to satisfy the debt. Id.
89. Id. at 594.
90. Id. The Court noted that the taxpayers who paid their taxes should not
have to wait for judicial proceedings to collect the taxes due from those taxpayers
who failed to pay. Id.
1995
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sell personalty to enforce payment of a tax, it also had the power
to seize and sell real property, because the same congressional
power was exercised for the same purpose.91
Fifty years later, in Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,92 the question before the Court was whether a hearing had
to be provided to determine liability before the government could
take away property rights." In Phillips, a stockholder owed
corporate taxes after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
made deficiency assessments against his corporation."I The
Court reaffirmed Springer, and held that a judicial determina-
tion of property rights could be delayed when satisfaction of a
debt owed to the government was imperative. 5 The Court con-
cluded that postponement of judicial proceedings was not a vio-
lation of due process, as long as there was an adequate opportu-
nity for later judicial determination of legal rights." Finding
that the government had a need to promptly secure revenues,
the Court reaffirmed its decision in Murray's Lessee. 7
The landmark case on the subject of search and seizure is
Boyd v. United States.9' The issue before the Court was wheth-
er evidence that was unreasonably seized could be used in a
forfeiture case." In Boyd, the forfeiture was recompense for the
defendant's failure to pay the customs duty when he imported
thirty-five cases of plate glass into the country."° The defen-
dant was compelled to produce his private records which would
be used at trial against him to forfeit his property."0 The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to forfeitures
because they were quasi-criminal in nature, as forfeiture of the
property was a penalty for breaking the law."° The Court con-
cluded that the government could not seize evidence to be used
91. Springer, 102 U.S. at 594.
92. 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
93. Phillips, 283 U.S. at 594.
94. Id. at 591.
95. Id. at 595.
96. Id. The Court asserted that summary proceedings to secure the payment
of debt to the government outweighed property rights of an individual. Id. The
Court further added that for public health reasons, a state could destroy property
without giving notice or a hearing. Id. at 597. Also, property could be seized without
notice or a hearing during times of war. Id.
97. Id. at 596. The Court noted that there was a long history in the United
States of permitting summary administrative proceedings to collect revenues owed to
the government. Id. at 595.
98. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
99. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
100. Id. at 617-18.
101. Id. at 618.
102. Id. at 634-35.
336 Vol. 33:327
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in a forfeiture proceeding without first satisfying the Fourth
Amendment."
In Weeks v. United States,1" the Court addressed the issue
of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when evidence
that was seized without a valid search warrant was admitted
into evidence in a criminal proceeding." The illegal search
and seizure occurred when police officers went into the
defendant's home without a search warrant and seized letters to
be used against the defendant at trial." The Court held, for
the first time, that the Fourth Amendment barred the use of
evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure in a
federal prosecution." 7 The majority asserted that the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment was to make the citizens of the Unit-
ed States feel secure in their homes from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and to limit the power of government from arbi-
trarily performing searches."
The Court in Wolf v. Colorado," however, did not apply the
Weeks exclusionary rule to prosecutions in state courts."0 The
question for consideration in Wolf was whether the Weeks doc-
trine, which excluded illegally obtained evidence from use in
federal courts, applied in state courts for state offenses.' The
Court concluded that there were compelling reasons to exclude
evidence illegally obtained by federal police."' One reason giv-
en was that public opinion would hold local police accountable
for their actions, whereas federal authorities would not be held
accountable." 3
The Court overruled Wolf twelve years later in Mapp v.
Ohio."' In Mapp, Cleveland police officers seized obscene ma-
terial from the defendant's home after breaking into the home
103. Id.
104. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
105. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389.
106. Id. at 386. The defendant was charged with illegally using the mails for a
lottery enterprise. Id. At trial, the defendant's objection that the use of his private
papers was a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment was overruled. Id. at
388.
107. Id. at 393-94.
108. Id. at 392. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment would have no
value if it permitted government to seize property through an illegal search. Id. at
393.
109. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33. Wolf was convicted of conspiracy to commit abor-
tions. Id. at 25.
111. Id. at 25.
112. Id. at 32.
113. Id.
114. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3371995
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without a warrant.11 The Court held that the exclusionary
rule in Weeks applied to proceedings in both state and federal
courts.1 " The majority further concluded that if the rule did
not apply to the states, the states would be encouraging disobe-
dience to the Constitution by allowing illegally seized evidence
into the courts."7
The Court next resolved the issue of whether the Weeks
exclusionary rule adopted in Mapp applied only to criminal pros-
ecutions or also to civil forfeitures." For the first time, the
Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,' held
that the Fourth Amendment placed restrictions on seizures
conducted for purposes of civil forfeiture proceedings." In One
1958 Plymouth Sedan, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board offi-
cers stopped and searched the defendant's car without a search
or arrest warrant, and found thirty-one cases of liquor that did
not have Pennsylvania tax seals.1 ' The officers seized both the
liquor and the car." The majority held that the exclusionary
rule applied to forfeiture proceedings, that the arrest was with-
out probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
that the car could not be seized." The Court concluded that
the exclusionary rule applied to forfeiture proceedings because a
breach of criminal law had to be proven, and the exclusionary
rule applied where criminal law applied." The Court stated
that forfeiture could result in a greater punishment than the
criminal prosecution itself"'
The Fourth Amendment clearly plays a role in civil forfei-
tures, as the preceding cases demonstrate. It is not the sole
constitutional provision, however, that courts must consider in
115. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. The materials taken from the house were used at
trial to convict defendant of possession of lewd pictures and photographs in violation
of Ohio law. Id. at 645 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.34 (repealed September 15,
1970)).
116. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
117. Id. at 657.
118. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
119. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
120. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 696.
121. Id. at 694. The officers stopped the vehicle as it was going towards Phila-
delphia from New Jersey because the car was too low to the ground. Id.
122. Id. At the hearing for forfeiture of the automobile, the defendant sought
dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding on the ground that the evidence was obtained
illegally. Id. at 694-95. The trial court sustained the objection on the basis that the
evidence (31 cases of liquor) was illegally obtained because the officers did not have
probable cause. Id. at 695.
123. Id. at 702.
124. Id. at 701.
125. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 701.
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seizure cases."se Courts must also weigh the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, which has been interpreted to re-
quire that an individual must have notice and a hearing prior to
a taking of property.'27
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' the
Court struck down the sufficiency of notice of judicial settlement
established by the New York Banking Law, because it deprived
account beneficiaries of due process of law."2 In its rationale,
the Court stated that prior to a deprivation of property, there
must be notice and an opportunity for a hearing.s Next, in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,"3' the Court struck down
summary garnishment proceedings because property was taken
without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 2 The Court
reasoned that the risk of error in Sniadach was substantial,
because the wage earner depended on the money to support his
family.1
33
Similarly, in Fuentes v. Shevin," the Court struck down
Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin proceedings1"
126. See Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992).
127. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
128. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
129. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320. The only notice that was required to be given
to beneficiaries was by newspaper. Id. at 309.
130. Id. at 313. The Court reasoned that the beneficiaries could be deprived of
property in two ways. I& First, an improper notice would enable a trustee, who
negligently managed a trust, to escape accountability, because the beneficiaries
would not have had notice. Id. Second, beneficiaries could lose fees and expenses
without knowing where their money was going. Id.
131. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
132. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342. In Wisconsin, the clerk of courts, by request of
the creditor's lawyer, started the garnishment process. Id. at 338. Hence, the wages
were frozen without a notice or hearing. Id. at 339. The wages could be unfrozen if
the wage earner prevailed at trial. Id. However, in the interim the wage .earner's
property was deprived without an opportunity to defend against the seizure of the
money. Id.
133. Id. at 340. Justice Black argued in his dissent that the Court did not
have the power to usurp state legislative power and decide state law. Id. at 345
(Black, J., dissenting).
134. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
135. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96. In Florida, the law required the creditor to file a
complaint with the court clerk, asserting that he had goods that were being
wrongfully detained. Id. at 74. The creditor was also required to file a security bond
in an amount double the value of the property. Id. After the creditor complied with
the law, a writ was issued that ordered a sheriff to take the property. Id. at 75.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania, a private party, through a summary process of ex parte
application to a clerk, could obtain a writ of replevin. Id. at 76. The Pennsylvania
law differed from the Florida law in that the party seeking the seizure of property
did not have to initiate a court action for replevin. Id. at 77. The party who lost
property was required to initiate the lawsuit. Id. at 78. Hence, there might never
have been an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim. Id. at 77.
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because they deprived persons of their property without notice
or a hearing, as required by the Due Process Clause."s The
Court argued that at the same moment the party received notice
that a creditor was seeking repossession of the property, the
property was seized. '37 The Court held that procedural due
process required at least a hearing before the state could autho-
rize its agents to seize property based on a complaint by one
party against another." The Court asserted that if the Fifth
Amendment right to notice and a hearing was to have value,
then it had to be granted before the deprivation occurred.'39
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,"' the Court distinguished the
repossession procedures involved from those at issue in
Fuentes."" Unlike the Pennsylvania and Florida laws at issue
in Fuentes, the Louisiana law in Mitchell allowed repossession of
the goods only after a judicial order."' This was contrary to
the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes that merely
required a writ of replevin to be issued by a court clerk." The
Court held that the Louisiana sequestration statute was consti-
tutional and did not violate due process.'" The Court conclud-
ed that the Louisiana system provided for an immediate hearing
and minimized the risk of error because the sequestration order
was judicial.1"
Another case that distinguished Fuentes was Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing," in which the Court held that due
process did not require preseizure notice and a hearing where
the property seized was a yacht.'4 7 The Court's rationale was
that the seizure of a yacht was an exigent circumstance as de-
fined by the Court in Fuentes." The Court reasoned that pro-
viding preseizure notice and a hearing might have frustrated
governmental interests because yachts may be easily relocated
136. Id. at 96.
137. Id. at 75.
138. Id. at 81.
139. Id.
140. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
141. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 615.
142. Id. at 616.
143. Id. at 615-16.
.144. Id. at 619-20. The Louisiana sequestration statute required the lien holder
who sought to forestall waste or alienation of the property to verify ownership by
affidavit. Id. at 616. Also, the verification must have been shown to a judge. Id.
Hence, repossession of the goods was made by a judicial order. Id.
145. Id. at 618.
146. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).




out of the Court's jurisdiction.' Also, unlike Fuentes, the gov-
ernment, not a self-interested private party, initiated the sei-
zure.
16
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge... was a landmark case re-
garding due process. In Mathews, the respondent challenged the
administrative procedures that terminated his social security
benefits."' In holding that the Fifth Amendment did not re-
quire a hearing before the termination of social security disabil-
ity benefits, the Court created a three-part balancing test.'
First, the Court weighed the party's private interest.'" The
Court then considered any risk of error in taking property with-
out notice and a hearing." Finally, the Court considered the
government's interest in taking the property." The majority
concluded that Eldridge failed the three-part test.'5 7 The Court
reasoned that his interest in the payments was not compelling
due to the fact that a disabled worker might have access to pri-
vate resources or government assistance." The Court further
found that there was a minimal risk of error because the deci-
sion to discontinue disability benefits was made on the basis of
unbiased medical reports that were prepared by physicians.15"
Finally, the majority concluded that the government had a sig-
nificant interest because any additional safeguards to the ad-
ministrative process would be outweighed by the cost."6
The Court in Connecticut v. Doehr"6' applied the Mathews
three-part test to determine whether a state prejudgment at-
tachment statute violated due process.'62  In Doehr, the
respondent's home was attached before he was afforded notice or
an opportunity for a hearing."6 The Court held that the Con-
necticut statute authorizing prejudgment attachment violated
due process because it failed to provide for a preattachment
149. Id
150. Id.
151. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
152. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324-25.
153. Id. at 349.
154. Id. at 335.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
158. Id. at 342.
159. Id. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
160. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
161. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
162. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.
163. Id. at 6. Connecticut procedures permitted a judge to grant prejudgment
attachment if there was an affidavit that was supported by probable cause. Id. at 5.
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hearing.' The majority asserted that failure to conduct a
preattachment hearing provided a substantial risk of error be-
cause the plaintiff was only required to make a sufficient com-
plaint that the defendant was liable." The Court concluded
that although the statute provided for an expeditious
postattachment adversary hearing, the defendant would still
have been deprived of his property.'"
Finally, in determining what constitutional provision applied
to seizures, the Court in Soldal v. Cook County"5 7 held that
dispossessing an owner of his mobile home was a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, even though the owner's privacy was
not invaded.'" The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
protected property as well as privacy."9 In its decision, the
Court dismissed the respondent's argument that the Fourth
Amendment was more concerned with privacy rights than prop-
erty rights. 70 The Court further asserted that the Fourth
Amendment protected property not only in a criminal context
but in a civil context as well. 7 ' The Court also addressed the
circuit court's reasoning that because the claim in the case in-
volved deprivation of property without due process of law, the
Fourth Amendment did not apply.' The Court noted that cer-
tain wrongs could affect more than one constitutional provi-
sion.' The Court explained that when a person's constitution-
al rights were violated, the Court would not limit its examina-
tion to the dominant constitutional provision, but rather would
examine all relevant constitutional provisions.174
In Good, a majority of the Court sought to enlarge the rights
of individuals involved in civil forfeiture proceedings. In arriving
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 15.
167. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
168. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 549. Two weeks before a hearing to decide if Soldal
should be evicted for nonpayment of rent, the owner of the trailer park illegally and
forcibly evicted the Soldal family. Id. at 541. At the time of the eviction, the sher-
iffs, who were present to make sure the home was removed, had knowledge that the
owner did not have an eviction order. Id. at 542.
169. Id. at 544. The majority noted that the word "house" is explicit in the
Fourth Amendment. Id. See note 27 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
170. Id. at 545. The respondent suggested that only if privacy or liberty inter-
ests were involved did the Fourth Amendment protect against unreasonable seizures
of property. Id.
171. Id. at 546.
172. Id. at 546-47. See Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).




at its decision, that Good was required to receive notice and a
hearing, the Court concluded that in civil forfeiture cases both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were applicable. 7" Further-
more, the Court held that neither Amendment took precedence
over the other.'
The Court followed its holding in Fuentes, which stated that
notice and a hearing had to be given prior to the deprivation of
property, unless extraordinary circumstances existed.'77 Ex-
traordinary circumstances were defined by that Court in three
situations.'78 First, there must be an important governmental
or public interest in the property for it to be seized.'79 Second,
there must exist a compelling reason for prompt action.80
Third, a governmental official must prove it necessary and justi-
fied to seize a person's property before affording notice and a
hearing. 8' The Court employed the same reasoning used in
Fuentes, when it held in Calero-Toledo that due process did not
require preseizure notice and a hearing.182 Because the proper-
ty seized in Calero-Toledo was a yacht, the Court held that there
were exigent circumstances and therefore preseizure notice and
a hearing was not required.8
Similarly, in 1991 the Court held in Doehr that absent exigent
circumstances, preseizure notice and a hearing had to be giv-
en."t4 Thus, the Court has used the Fuentes reasoning when
analyzing due process violations throughout the past two de-
cades. It reaffirmed the requirement that the existence of exi-
gent circumstances only justified a seizure of property without
notice and a hearing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Good, took the posi-
tion that property owners involved in civil forfeiture proceedings
were afforded adequate safeguards through the Fourth Amend-
ment and rejected the majority's expansive application of
Mathews." However, by examining the Court's holding that
175. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 500-01. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91.
178. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91.
179. Id. at 91.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80.
183. Id.
184. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16. The Court stated that the respondent did not
threaten to encumber, or otherwise damage the property that would have given rise
to exigent circumstances that would be needed not to give a notice and a hearing,
Id.
185. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 507-08 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are applicable in forfei-
ture proceedings, and by examining precedent that applied the
Fuentes rationale, it is clear that the Court has rejected the
theory that the Fourth Amendment provides the sole measure of
Constitutional protection afforded to owners in forfeiture pro-
ceedings.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that it was inconsistent to
disallow the government to take real property based on probable
cause, but allow the government to restrict a person's freedom
based on probable cause, is misplaced. The government restricts
a person's freedom when that person poses a threat to society;
this threat provides the exigent circumstance that allows the
individual's due process rights to be invaded. Conversely, in
Good, the real property did not pose a danger to the public, and
thus, did not provide an exigent circumstance that required
seizure of the property without notice and a hearing.
Justice O'Connor's conclusion, that the likelihood of error is
reduced because Good pled guilty to promoting a harmful drug,
does not have merit. A conviction does not necessarily mean that
Good used his property to carry out the crime. Property owners
must be provided notice and a hearing prior to the seizure in
order to prevent a wrongful deprivation. At the preseizure hear-
ing the property owner has the opportunity to defend against
the charge that the property was used to perpetrate the crime.
The government does not have a legitimate reason to seize the
property before the hearing. As the majority reasoned, the
government's need to raise revenue by ex parte procedures no
longer exists." Therefore, because a person was convicted of a
crime does not connote that the person used their real property
to cariy out that crime. The preseizure hearing is needed to
determine if the real property was part and parcel of the crime.
In the future, property owners in civil forfeiture cases will be
required to receive a preseizure notice and a hearing pursuant
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, unless exi-
gent circumstances exist. Once the Court determines that no
exigent circumstances exist, it is well settled that the Court will
determine whether the seizure of real property complied with
the Due Process Clause by using the Mathews' three part bal-
ancing test.'87
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186. Id. at 504. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 501. Over the past twenty years the Court has applied the Mathews
three part test to determine when a violation of due process has occurred. Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
344 Vol. 33:327
